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REQUIEM FOR HERCULES 
SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF EQUALITY. By Ronald Dworkin.1 
Harvard University Press. 2000. $35.00. 
Edward B. Pole/ 
In my home state of Ohio, as in many others, the highest 
court in the state is struggling with how to specify the constitu-
tional standard for an adequate system of public education.3 
This judicial task is rooted in the constitutional principle of 
"equal protection": surely, this principle must embrace some 
conception of equal, or at least adequate, educational opportuni-
ties for all children in the state. Yet defining a constitutionally 
appropriate standard of educational opportunity turns out to be 
a very tricky task.4 
One might have thought that a newly published book on 
"the theory and practice of equality" would offer some assis-
tance on this currently vexing question about the appropriate 
constitutional standard of educational opportunity. But Ronald 
Dworkin's new book makes no such effort. Its failure to do so is 
emblematic of the gap between what is promised by its title and 
what is actually delivered in its pages. 
I do not wish to be harsh in this review, and I certainly have 
no illusions that this particular critique of one book will (or 
should) damage Dworkin's justly deserved reputation in general 
for being a leading figure (perhaps the leading figure) in Anglo-
I. Frank Henry Sommer Professor of Law, New York University, and Quain Pro-
fessor of Jurisprudence, University College of London. 
2. Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law at the Ohio State University. As will 
become apparent, this review draws upon my experience during the last two years as 
State Solicitor of Ohio, although the views expressed herein are solely my own. 
3. See DeRolph v. State, 93 Ohio St.3d 628, 758 (2001); DeRolph v. State, 89 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 728 N.E.2d 993 (2000); DeRolph v. State, 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 677 N.E.2d 733 
(1997). The issue is back before the Ohio Supreme Court for yet a fourth time. 
4. My own effort to address this topic is Edward B. Foley, Rodriguez Revisited: 
Constitutional Theory and School Finance, 32 Ga. L. Rev. 475 (1998). 
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American jurisprudence in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury. But Dworkin's stature and well-recognized brilliance, as 
well as his own professed ambition to provide us with a system-
atic and useful account of equality as a political principle, carry 
the consequence that, insofar as he falls short, he falls from a 
much greater height. 
I. EQUALITY AND INHERITED WEALTH 
Dworkin's project is to give us a theory of political equality 
that, upon analysis and reflection, we will find morally compel-
ling (i.e., we feel obligated to subscribe to it as long as we are 
willing to take seriously our basic moral commitment to other 
persons as fellow human beings). Dworkin also wants his theory 
to be useful in the specific sense that it will entail, or at least 
strongly suggest, outcomes to specific and concrete questions of 
justice that confront society (such as how much health insurance 
should government provide to each citizen). But Dworkin's in-
ability to address the issue of educational opportunity means 
that his project is neither philosophically persuasive nor practi-
cally useful. 
I make this point about educational opportunity because, as 
shall become apparent in the course of this critique, having a 
point of view concerning the relative educational opportunities 
of children born at the same time within a society is an essential 
element to providing a theory of justice applicable over time, 
from one generation to the next. Moreover, since Thomas Jef-
ferson and Benjamin Rush addressed this issue during the 
Founding generation, our Nation has been intensely concerned 
with the moral question of educational fairness for all the Na-
tion's youth. Consequently, a theory of justice that purports to 
be comprehensive- but has no answer for how to allocate edu-
cational opportunity fairly among all our Nation's children-
inevitably will lack currency for policymakers who need to make 
actual decisions on this pressing topic. 
The basic idea of social insurance. Dworkin's basic strategy 
is to hypothesize a desert island and to imagine how a group of 
individuals stranded there would divvy up the island's resources 
if they were committed to securing political equality among 
themselves. In this respect, Dworkin's project is similar to pre-
vious works of political and legal philosophy.5 Not surprisingly, 
5. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (Yale U. Press, 
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Dworkin believes that the island's natural resources should be 
shared equally among all its new inhabitants, and he devises an 
auction in which equal lots may be parceled out. 
Dworkin's theory of equality does not stop with this division 
of natural resources. Reasonably enough, he recognizes that dif-
ferences among individuals in their own natural talents may 
make a strictly equal distribution of natural resources unfair. 
Individuals born with severe genetic defects may need more 
natural resources than other individuals just to maintain the 
same standard of living. Consequently, Dworkin devises an in-
surance mechanism to rectify this situation. 
Dworkin devotes much of his attention to the details of his 
hypothetical auction and insurance schemes. These theoretical 
details may be of interest to the inhabitants of philosophy de-
partments engaged in the purest forms of political theory, but I 
doubt they will be of much interest to lawyers and judges, or 
even law professors, who seek insights from political philosophy 
in order to resolve particular legal disputes. Even if we agree 
with Dworkin on all of these details, there remains a much more 
fundamental problem: securing a fair system of insurance for all 
the initial inhabitants of a desert island does not tell us what 
would be fair for successive generations of inhabitants on the is-
land. 
What, in principle, is the right amount of "inheritance insur-
ance"? It might be an exaggeration to say that the only interest-
ing question of justice is how to achieve a fair allocation of re-
sources among each new generation of children born into the 
world. But surely it is a crucial question, since all nation-states 
are intended to survive from each generation to the next. 
Dworkin, however, seems peculiarly uninterested in the problem 
of justice, over time, among successive generations of a society. 
Dworkin devotes only a few short pages to the subject (pp. 
346-49), and all he says there is that his insurance idea can be 
employed to conceptualize the amount of insurance a child 
would want to purchase to guard against the risk of lazy or un-
generous parents (who are unable or unwilling to bequeath rela-
tively large amounts of wealth to their children).6 The difficulty 
1980) which, in a more science fiction version of the same scenario, imagined a group of 
humans settling a deserted planet. 
6. Since children, especially those not yet born, cannot purchase insurance for 
themselves, Dworkin hypothesizes the existence of guardians who purchase insurance on 
t~eir behal!. These guardians are essentially the same as those in Rawls's original posi-
tion, especially on Rawls's most recent interpretation of this idea. See John Rawls, Jus-
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with this idea is that Dworkin is unable to identify, even in prin-
ciple, how much "inheritance insurance" any individual would 
(or should) want to purchase. This difficulty, moreover, seems 
inherently insurmountable, because each individual must bal-
ance two conflicting interests corresponding to two distinct 
points in the person's life. First, an individual has an interest as 
a child and young adult in receiving an ample bequest from his 
or her parents, and indeed the very concept of inheritance insur-
ance is to protect this interest. Second, however, the same indi-
vidual at a latter stage in his or her life also has an interest in be-
ing able to transmit an ample bequest to his or her own children. 
The tax on bequests that would pay for inheritance insurance 
would impair this second interest. 
The question then is at what level to set this tax, in order to 
balance an individual's interests in both obtaining inheritance in-
surance and passing wealth to one's own children. I know of no 
philosophical basis for answering this question, and Dworkin 
gives us none. The matter seems one that is susceptible to per-
sonal preference. One individual could have a strong preference 
for a larger bequest as a child (resulting in a diminished capacity 
to benefit his or her own child), while another could have a 
strong preference in the opposite direction (a willingness to re-
ceive less as a child in order to pass on more to one's own chil-
dren). All Dworkin can say is that many individuals might want 
to adopt a high marginal rate for the tax on bequests, reflecting a 
willingness to forego a very large bequest to their own children 
in order to protect against the chance that they might be very 
much poorer as a child than their own contemporaries (p. 349). 
The imprecision of Dworkin's answer to this question is un-
settling. To be sure, we cannot expect political philosophy to tell 
us that the marginal rate for inheritance taxes should be 70 in-
stead of 65 percent. That kind of line-drawing depends too 
much on empirical facts about local conditions (the circum-
stances of a particular society here and now). But we have come 
to expect that, at least in principle, political philosophy should be 
able to tell us what value a fair rate of taxation is designed to 
achieve. 
For example, perhaps the tax rate should be set to maximize 
the amount of revenue the IRS is able to collect from the tax, in 
order to have the most money available for paying out benefits 
tice as Fairness: A Restatement 84 (Belknap Press, 2001): "The parties [in the original po-
sition], as representatives of free and equal citizens, act as trustees or guardians." 
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under the inheritance insurance policy. Alternatively, perhaps 
the tax rate should be set to maximize the total wealth of society, 
so that in the aggregate there is the most available to pass from 
generation to generation.7 The goal of political philosophy his-
torically has been to identify some such value, or principle, as 
the right one for the tax system to pursue, leaving to technical 
experts the task of determining the rate, 65 or 70 percent (or 
whatever), most likely to correspond to the value identified by 
political philosophy. 
In this light, Dworkin's answer-that inheritance taxes 
should be set high enough that no one child receives an inheri-
tance making him or her "very much richer" than his or her con-
temporaries (p.349)-is unsatisfying in principle. How much 
richer is "very much"? And, indeed, what is wrong with a tax 
system that permits affluent parents to make their own children 
"very much richer" than the children of less affluent (or less 
generous) parents, so long as all inhabitants of society are guar-
anteed an annual income that provides a decent standard of liv-
ing, as Dworkin himself stipulates before considering the issue of 
unequal inheritances? His hypothetical idea of purchasing in-
heritance insurance cannot answer these questions, since decid-
ing not to buy any such insurance at all (especially when one al-
ready is guaranteed an adequate annual income) cannot be ruled 
out as unreasonable. 
To see the problem more clearly, let us imagine a congress 
of fiduciaries gathered together to determine the appropriate 
level of inheritance insurance for each child born in a given year. 
Assume one fiduciary is assigned to each child, and each fiduci-
ary is properly motivated to act in the best interests of that child, 
as best as the fiduciary can determine it. We need to assume 
also that each fiduciary is ignorant of the particular socio-
economic circumstances into which each child is born, since pay-
ing taxes for inheritance insurance is of no interest to the child 
lucky enough to be born into a family with super-rich parents 
motivated to bequeath their vast fortune to their children, and 
the whole of point of this congress is to off-set the "brute luck" 
of having parents with their particular level of wealth and per-
sonal motivations. 
This congress of fiduciaries is beginning to look a lot like 
7. These two strategies are likely to be different, since maximizing IRS tax reve-
nues would tend to create economic disincentives that would prevent maximizing the 
total wealth of society. 
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Rawls's "original position," with its attendant difficulties. How 
should the fiduciaries decide what is the right level of inheritance 
insurance for all of their children? Suppose one fiduciary an-
nounces to the congress, "Let's abandon this idea of inheritance 
insurance. We've already guaranteed each child other forms of 
social insurance throughout their lifetimes, including a minimum 
wage, a minimum pension, and a minimum level of health insur-
ance. I don't think there is any need to guarantee a minimum 
level of inheritance as well. On the contrary, I think there is a 
better than fifty-fifty chance that the child for whom I am exer-
cising fiduciary responsibility will grow up to be a parent who 
will want no taxes imposed on wealth bequeathed to his or her 
own children." 
Should the other fiduciaries be convinced by this argument? 
Alternatively, is there any counter-argument that these other fi-
duciaries ought to provide that should convince this fiduciary to 
change viewpoints on this issue? Perhaps we cannot expect that 
even hypothetical fiduciaries, behind a veil of ignorance, would 
be able to convince each other to settle unanimously on a social 
contract containing a principle for determining the right level of 
inheritance insurance. Perhaps then we should let the congress 
of fiduciaries settle the issue by majority vote. 
But how should a conscientious fiduciary go about deciding 
for himself or herself what, in principle, is the right level of social 
insurance to vote for? There are obviously lots of different op-
tions to choose from. It doesn't seem right that the fiduciary 
would choose the option most in accord with his or her own per-
sonal tastes: that's not exercising the role of the fiduciary. But 
Dworkin has nothing else to offer: there is no standard for de-
termining what principle of inheritance insurance this congress 
of fiduciaries should adopt. And so there is no way to criticize 
any congress- hypothetical or real-for failing to adopt a suffi-
cient level of inheritance insurance. 
The promise of political philosophy was that it would offer 
thoughtful citizens a basis for claiming that policies adopted by 
the existing government in society were unjust and should be 
changed. Dworkin accepted the challenge of living up to that 
promise. Regrettably, like Rawls and others both before and 
since, Dworkin ultimately cannot deliver as promised. 
II. SCHOOL FUNDING 
Dworkin's inability to answer the inheritance issue points to 
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the problem he would have if he were to address the question of 
school funding that currently vexes so many state supreme 
courts. Following Dworkin's own strategy regarding the issue of 
inheritance, one might attempt to extrapolate Dworkin's insur-
ance idea to the issue of statewide support for local public edu-
cation. In other words, one could conceive of the financial sup-
port that a state provides less affluent local school districts as a 
kind of insurance policy that individuals might buy to guard 
against the possibility that they, or their children, might live in a 
less affluent district. 
One problem with this approach, however, is the same 
problem we saw with the application of the insurance idea to the 
issue of inheritance: it was impossible to specify, even in princi-
ple, the right level of insurance that an individual should buy. 
An individual's interest in bequeathing wealth to his or her own 
children undercut the same individual's interest in taxing be-
quests in order to sustain a high level of inheritance insurance, 
and Dworkin can offer no principle for reconciling this conflict 
of interests. The identical point applies here: an individual's in-
terest in a high level of "school funding insurance" conflicts with 
the same individual's interest in sending his or her own children 
to school in a more affluent district. (If the more affluent district 
is taxed to pay for the "school funding insurance," as would be 
analogous to the tax on bequests to pay for "inheritance insur-
ance," then the interest in a low level of taxation inevitably con-
flicts with the interest in a high level of insurance, and there is no 
principle for identifying an appropriately fair level of taxation.)8 
But there is an even more fundamental problem with apply-
ing the insurance idea to the school funding issue. Ordinarily, 
we think of insurance as a kind of "safety net," and indeed 
Dworkin himself thinks of insurance in this way. His goal with 
respect to income insurance and health insurance is to identify, 
at least in principle, the amount of insurance that individuals 
would buy if they were purchasing this insurance in a condition 
8. Recall, here, that an individual's relative interests in both receiving "social 
funding insurance" and being free from the obligation to pay for this insurance is to be 
determined, ex ante, by a guardian who does not know the chances that the individual 
will actually need this insurance for his or her own education or, later in life, for his or 
her children's education. Thus, even though for some people living today it would be 
easy to tell whether they would benefit more from higher or lower levels of this "school 
funding insurance," in the hypothetical situation where we are trying to identify what is 
the "right" level of insurance to buy for all persons, it is impossible to make this determi-
nation. 
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of equality. This approach, then, would tell us where to set the 
safety net. 
It is incongruous to think of education as a kind of safety 
net. On the contrary, education is an essential ingredient that 
molds a child into adult, which occurs before an adult enters the 
social world to which the idea of a safety net subsequently is ap-
plied. To put this point colloquially, education is something that 
gets an individual to the starting line, in order to run the race of 
life. A safety net, like a crutch or a stretcher, is something you 
give to an individual who trips and falls during the race. 
For this reason, we tend to think that a fair system of public 
education must be rooted in a concept of equal opportunity that 
is a stronger principle than, and has a priority over, the opera-
tion of a social safety net. This thought is captured in the notion 
that, first and foremost, we must give a child an adequate educa-
tion, and after we have satisfied this condition we can talk about 
what kind of welfare programs should be available after this 
child grows up to be an adult. It is not surprising, then, that Re-
publicans tend to support more generous grants for improving 
public education than they do for guaranteeing each adult a 
minimal level of income and health insurance. 
Thus, one might have wished that Dworkin's systematic 
study of the "theory and practice of equality" would have ad-
dressed this distinct concept of equal opportunity and how it fits 
into an overall regime that shows equal concern for each of its 
citizens. But Dworkin does not do so.9 Since he largely ignores 
the problems of achieving justice among children as a conse-
quence of their membership in families, concentrating instead on 
how to achieve justice among adults who are hypothesized to 
start a new society in a position of initial equality, Dworkin 
never confronts the fundamental question of what constitutes 
fair educational opportunities for all children in light of the fact 
that different families have different resources with which to 
educate their own children. 
Not that Dworkin would have had much success if he had 
tackled the concept of fair educational opportunities. John 
Rawls, the great philosopher whom Dworkin (like so many oth-
ers) attempts to emulate, has wrestled with this idea for over 
9. He does, in responding to one critic of his earlier work on equality, use the term 
"equality of opportunity" (see p. 289-90), but he does so to refer to an abstract concept 
much different from the idea of giving each citizen an equal education, so that economic 
competition among adults will be fair. 
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thirty years and recently confessed to having gotten nowhere. In 
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Rawls attempts to encapsulate 
the essence of his earlier work, A Theory of Justice, while at the 
same time modifying some points in response to his critics. As in 
A Theory of Justice itself, in his Restatement Rawls gives the idea 
of a "fair equal of opportunity" a prominent position: although 
subordinate to a system of equal liberties, it has supremacy over 
his principle for redistributing wealth from those more fortunate 
to others less so. (In this regard, Rawls's ordering of his princi-
ples of justice tracks our own intuitions about the priority of 
equal educational opportunities over securing a social safety net 
for income and health insurance.) 
But Rawls now acknowledges that, essentially, he has no 
idea what this idea of "fair equality of opportunity" really means 
or how to identify what it might entail. In a footnote, he writes: 
"Some think that [a strict] priority of fair equality of opportunity 
over the difference principle is too strong, and that either a 
weaker priority or a weaker form of the opportunity principle 
would be better . . . . At present I do not know what is best here 
and simply register my uncertainty. How to specify and weight 
the opportunity principle is a matter of great difficulty and some 
such alternative may well be better. "10 We must applaud Rawls's 
candor about this impasse, because surely it must be frustrating 
to have such a crucial component of one's theory so unsettled. 
Dworkin, by contrast, does not seem to realize just what 
desperate straits he is in. He wants his own ideal regime to de-
pend entirely upon a distinction between "choice and chance" 
(p. 287): an individual's economic fate should depend upon his 
or her own choices in life, but not upon that individual's bad 
luck. This idea is certainly a sympathetic one, but Dworkin ap-
parently does not realize that ultimately it is unsustainable be-
cause of the role of families in a person's life. 
When discussing his idea of inheritance insurance, Dworkin 
says: "Luck, for purposes of our analysis, includes what might be 
thought to be matters of identity as well as accidents that happen 
once identity is fixed, and the situation and properties of one's 
parents or relatives are as much a matter of luck, in that sense, as 
one's own physical powers" (p. 347). Because no child should be 
saddled with the misfortunate of poor parenting, Dworkin de-
vises his idea of inheritance insurance. But parents bequeath to 
their children much more than just their material wealth. The 
10. Rawls, Restatement at 163 n.44 (cited in note 6) (emphasis added). 
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resources that some parents provide their own children include 
the distinctive form of education that occurs at the family dinner 
table, and in some families this education is much more enlight-
ening than others. The only way to achieve Dworkin's ideal goal 
of "equality of resources" would be to eliminate the family as a 
social institution and to adopt, instead, Plato's idea of socialized 
nurseries. And this, of course, we are not about to do. 
The reason we reject socialized nurseries, moreover, reveals 
the fundamental flaw of Dworkin's project. We reject them be-
cause we insist on having the choice of influencing the upbring-
ing of our own offspring. Yet it is this fundamental choice that 
causes differential luck to the members of future generations. 
Protecting this fundamental choice means that, in truth, we do 
not want a person's economic situation to be insensitive to rela-
tive misfortunate. On the contrary, we want the totality of re-
sources, educational and otherwise, that each child obtains dur-
ing childhood to depend (at least in part) on what that child 
receives from the family into which that child is born. Ulti-
mately, then, the choice/luck distinction cannot capture what we 
want a theory of justice to provide.11 
Our desire to permit parents to influence the education of 
their own children is so fundamental that we have protected it as 
an essential element of our constitutional law, even though this 
parental liberty is nowhere mentioned in the text of the Consti-
tution itself. Again, one would have thought that Dworkin's 
background and interest in constitutional law would have led 
him to discuss Pierce v. Society of Sisters12 and the relationship of 
this constitutional liberty with the problem of equalizing educa-
tional opportunity. But Dworkin has nothing for us on this most 
basic point, and because of critical omission his attempt to de-
velop a systematic theory of equality must be judged a failure. 
II. In a chapter on the moral implications of genetic engineering, Dworkin recog-
nizes that his choice/chance distinction becomes radically undermined if parents get to 
choose the genetic identity of their children (p. 444-46). But, to a great extent, parents 
choose-or at least significantly shape-the identity of their children through formal and 
informal education. The power of a parent to make a child smarter by reading to that 
children from birth to age three-years-old seems no different, in this respect, from the 
power of a parent to make a child smarter by selecting an intelligence gene from a menu 
provided by a genetic engineer. Indeed, Dworkin himself makes a similar point in an-
other context (p. 443). Thus, the brave new world of parental power is already upon us 
and, in fact, has been with us for thousands of years. A parent's power over a child's 
education collapses the choice/chance distinction, just as does the genetic engineering 
that Dworkin fears. 
12. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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III. CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
If philosophers like Dworkin and Rawls cannot give us a 
meaningful principle of justice-one which would tell us, among 
other things, how much funding to reallocate from affluent 
school districts to less affluent ones-what then are we to do? 
The answer should be apparent to anyone familiar with 
John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust:13 whenever political 
philosophy is unable to settle upon a substantive solution to a 
problem of justice, turn instead to a procedural solution. In 
other words, let's improve our processes for making democrati-
cally such tax-and-spending decisions as those involved in the 
school funding debates. 
To his credit, Dworkin devotes considerable attention in his 
book to one important defect in our current political processes: 
the substantial advantage of affluent citizens to broadcast their 
preferred political messages under our current campaign finance 
laws. Moreover, Dworkin's discussion of this issue offers an im-
portant theoretical contribution, one that might eventually prove 
useful in actual litigation concerning the constitutionality of 
campaign finance reforms. In this sense, then, Dworkin's discus-
sion of campaign finance provides a practical payoff, promised 
but missing from elsewhere in his book. 
Dworkin's theoretical insight is to observe that citizens of 
democracy are not merely consumers of public discussion of po-
litical issues but also participants in that discussion themselves. 
As equals in their citizenship, citizens should be able to engage 
in this participation on equal terms (or at least roughly so). This 
right of equal participation provides a reason to restrain rich citi-
zens from using their personal wealth to increase their own abil-
ity to participate relative to poor citizens, even if as consumers of 
political discourse citizens have no reason to limit the participa-
tion of the rich (p. 358). 
Also to Dworkin's credit, he attempts to show how his theo-
retical insight about equal participation might be used by advo-
cates seeking to overrule that portion of Buckley v. Valeo 14 
which invalidated legislative limits on campaign spending. For 
all his time spent on pure political philosophy, Dworkin is still a 
brilliant lawyer, and his discussion of relevant First Amendment 
13. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard 
U. Press, 1980). 
14. 425 U.S. 96 (1976). 
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caselaw is dazzling. The dexterity with which Dworkin lines up 
particular precedents in support of the principle of equal partici-
pation, including a different portion of Buckley itself, is a formi-
dable piece of advocacy, the benefits of which I would want to 
incorporate were I attempting to defend a new expenditure limit 
back in the Supreme Court (pp. 373-80). 
Even so, I remain uneasy about how Dworkin structures his 
argument for overruling Buckley. Based on my own experience 
as State Solicitor of Ohio during the last couple of years, there is 
still a large gap between Dworkin's approach and how one 
would argue the issue in the Supreme Court. First of all, 
Dworkin's analysis of the relevant caselaw- however brilliant it 
is-does not give the precedential force of Buckley its due. The 
Court would not line up a set of precedents favoring equal par-
ticipation on one side, with Buckley on the other, as Dworkin 
himself does, to see whether this principle of equal participation 
is a better "fit" with the Court's caselaw as a whole. Instead, the 
Court would start with Buckley itself as directly on-point author-
ity for the proposition that spending limits are unconstitutional, 
and then ask whether there is sufficient reason to overrule that 
specific determination. I am not at all sure that, standing alone, 
theoretical inconsistency between that holding and other First 
Amendment decisions would suffice to dislodge the precedent. 
Instead, I would want to take to the Court some compelling 
factual proposition about Buckley being untenable in light of the 
evidence since 1976 about how campaigns are actually financed 
by real-world politicians. This is why Vincent Blasi's point about 
the inability of politicians to devote their time and attention to 
policy because of incessant fundraising-a point that is powerful 
in part because it lacks pretense of theoretical grandeur-is 
more likely to persuade the Court than Dworkin's offer of a new 
theoretical insight about the nature of democracy.15 
And even if I were to include in a brief to the Court a point 
about this idea of equal participation, I would not want to be so 
imperious as to claim that this idea emanates from a superior 
conception of democracy than the consumer-of-political-
information perspective underlying Buckley itself. Rather, I 
15. See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fundraising: Why 
Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1281 (1994). In fact, the Supreme Court recently cited Blasi's article as possible 
basis for revisiting the Buckley holding on expenditure limits in some future case. Fed-
eral Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 533 
U.S. 431,442 n.8 (June 25, 2001). 
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would want to observe only that reasonable people can differ 
about which conception of democracy is superior, and because 
neither the text nor history of the First Amendment presupposes 
one over the other, democratic processes themselves should be 
free to select which conception of democracy they wish to 
adopt. 16 Dworkin would do well to include within his own ar-
gument a more modest approach of this kind, which appeals to 
the distinctive institutional role of the Court in constitutional 
cases and the appropriate degree of deference owed to legisla-
tures (state and federal) when the Constitution itself is indeter-
minate and citizens reasonably may disagree about the underly-
ing philosophical or policy judgments necessary to settle the 
constitutional question. But Dworkin's argument for overruling 
Buckley is infected by his earlier work on constitutional interpre-
tation, which presupposes the possibility of "right answers" 
rooted in philosophical truth. 17 
IV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
A related point can be made about Dworkin's discussion of 
affirmative action. He devotes two chapters to this topic, and 
together they bolster the point that persuasive arguments on 
contestable questions of constitutional law are more likely to de-
rive from new facts rather than new theory. Indeed, Dworkin's 
first chapter on affirmative action is devoted to the new empiri-
cal evidence generated by the monumental study undertaken by 
William Bowen and Derek Bok and published in their book The 
Shape of the River. The power of their statistical findings is, as 
Dworkin seems to realize himself, much stronger than the doc-
trinal or theoretical points he adds to this statistical evidence. 
Let's cut to the chase: although Dworkin still drags his feet a 
bit on accepting "strict scrutiny" in affirmative action cases, we 
all know winning these cases requires convincing a majority of 
the Court that racial diversity among university students is an in-
terest "compelling" enough to justify considering an applicant's 
race as an admissions factor. Persuading the Court on this point 
is unlikely to stem from any new theoretical proposition but in-
stead from new evidence about how racial diversity in class-
rooms, and on campuses more generally, actually contributes to 
16. I have explored this point at greater length in Edward B. Foley, Philosophy, the 
Constitution, and Campaign Finance, 10 Stan. L. & Policy Rev. 23 (1998). 
17. See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American 
Constitution (Harvard U. Press, 1996). 
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the learning process of all students. 
Moreover, as the litigators in the trenches know well, win-
ning the argument that diversity is, indeed, a "compelling" inter-
est is only half the battle. They still need to show that race-
sensitive admissions are "necessary" to secure this interest, and 
the counterargument inevitably will be that they are unnecessary 
because university can achieve racial diversity using the kind of 
"top five or ten percent" admissions programs adopted in Texas 
and elsewhere. To be sure, these alternatives do damage other 
goals a university's admissions policy might wish to pursue. For 
example, they lower the overall standardized test scores of an 
entering class. But then the question becomes whether the de-
sire to attain a higher level of these scores justifies the considera-
tion of race as part of the admissions process. Dworkin adds lit-
tle insight on this important issue. 
Insofar as Dworkin devotes his attention to the ends, rather 
than the means, of affirmative action, he is right to wish that the 
defense of these admissions programs rested upon a second justi-
fication, in addition to diversity (p. 423). But using theoretically 
"top-down" (rather than empirically "bottom-up") methodol-
ogy, as Dworkin generally does, may have caused him to miss 
what strikes me as the most promising new approach of this 
kind. In footnote 43 of his opinion in Bakke, Justice Powell rec-
ognized that it might be necessary for a university to consider 
race in its admissions process in order to correct for a racially 
disparate impact in its other admissions criteria.18 The university 
in Bakke did not attempt to make that argument, but evidence 
now exists that would enable universities to do so in the future. 
The most important new evidence on this point comes from 
a study of graduates from the University of Michigan Law 
School.19 This evidence, covering three decades, shows that mi-
nority graduates are just as successful in the practice of law as 
white graduates, even though they entered law school with infe-
rior LSATs. This evidence then tell us, as Justice Powell sug-
gested, that it is necessary to supplement a law school's use of 
LSATs as an admissions criterion with a consideration of an ap-
plicant's race, so that LSAT scores do not cause minorities to be 
underrepresented in law school admissions relative to their ca-
18. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306 n.43 (1978) (Pow-
ell, J.). 
19. Richard 0. Lempert, et al., Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice: The 
River Runs Through Law School, 25 1. L. & Soc. Inq. 395 (2000). 
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pacity to for equal success in the practice of law. 
Perhaps it is wrong to criticize Dworkin for failing to de-
velop this evidence-dependent alternative defense of affirmative 
action. One cannot expect a philosopher to be aware of all the 
empirical data bubbling up from the routine operations of the 
legal profession. But this fact inevitably leads me to the conclu-
sion that, on the whole, the academic study of law would be bet-
ter served by spending proportionally more of its time observing 
ordinary legal events and less time theorizing about abstract le-
gal concepts. 
In fairness to Dworkin, this is not a conclusion I would have 
come to, in all likelihood, except for my recent experience im-
mersed in actual litigation myself: even though virtually all of my 
caseload as State Solicitor concerned constitutional questions in 
appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, I had little occa-
sion to turn to the kind of scholarship undertaken by Dworkin 
and others-including myself in my previous academic work. At 
the same time, however, I often found myself looking for schol-
arship that would help me think through a task I confronted in a 
particular pending case. For example, one challenge as an advo-
cate is to be effective rhetorically about precedent that "cuts the 
other way," yet I found surprisingly little (beyond basic legal 
writing texts) to help in this rhetorical enterprise. Perhaps I was 
looking in the wrong places, but it is also perhaps a reflection on 
"legal academia," as it has developed over the last couple of 
decades, that a professor of constitutional law with ten years ex-
perience would not have "at his fingertips" a handful of sources 
about the art of presenting an effective argument in a tricky con-
stitutional case. Instead, this professor could instantly cite five 
(or even ten) sources about how leading academics would rule if 
they were privileged to be sitting on the bench. 
Not that there is no place for the kind of theoretical or nor-
mative scholarship that has become so fashionable among pro-
fessors of constitutional law in recent years. Only that the bal-
ance of scholarly attention has shifted too far in one direction 
and should shift back towards the center. We are all a product 
of the culture in which we reside, and the culture of legal acade-
mia, at least within the field of constitutional law, has been 
dominated for some time by a belief that a systematic theory-of 
the kind pursued by Dworkin-is the profession's holy grail. 
The results of Dworkin's project, however, suggest that it is 
time to scale back our ambitions. 
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CONCLUSION: 
REORIENTING CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARSHIP 
The upshot is that Dworkin's enterprise has run its course. 
For the last thirty years, since Rawls published A Theory of Jus-
tice, Dworkin and others have endeavored to apply political phi-
losophy to the exercise of constitutional interpretation. The 
thought was that an ideal judge-Dworkin called him Hercu-
les-would be able to discover philosophical truth, in a Rawlsian 
spirit, and incorporate that truth in constitutional interpretation. 
In Dworkin's own words from 1972, he explicitly "argue[ d] for a 
fusion of constitutional law and moral theory," invoking Rawls's 
Theory of Justice as a work that "no constitutional lawyer will be 
able to ignore. "20 
Three decades later, however, Rawls himself now acknowl-
edges that he does not have the answers after all. And insofar as 
Sovereign Virtue represents Dworkin's best attempt to develop a 
philosophical theory of equality that could underlie the interpre-
tation of the "equal protection" clause, we have seen that 
Dworkin's effort fares no better than Rawls's. The answers just 
aren't there. 
This realization means we need a different approach to con-
stitutional scholarship than the mission Dworkin and his follow-
ers have set out on for the last three decades. It is time to bury 
Hercules, although I say this not without regret. I, too, had 
hoped that the Herculean question for right answers to constitu-
tional questions would prove successful, at least in principle. But 
wishing it will not make it so. 
I do not go so far to say that we should altogether abandon 
normative scholarship within the field of constitutional law. I 
just doubt that it can be of the Herculean kind. Instead, we 
should aim for more modest, incrementalist points that tend to 
be evidentiary, rather than theoretical, in nature. This last 
comment might seem unduly influenced by the kind of Supreme 
Court we currently have, which (as we all know) is dominated in 
the center by moderate, incrementalist jurists. But I think the 
point goes deeper than the current composition of the Court. 
Rather, I think it reflects the fact that we cannot expect answers 
on Big Questions, and so necessarily must search for answers to 
smaller ones. 
20. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 149 (Harvard U. Press, 1977). 
